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Question Two. Whether the Character is Some Absolute Form
279. Proceeding thus to the second question [n.186], and argument is made thus, that character is not an absolute form:
Because according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2.4.1105b20, “there are three things in the soul, power, passion, and habit.” Character is not a power, as is plain, because it is not naturally in the soul itself; nor is it a passion, because it is an abiding form; nor is it a habit, because a habit is that according to which he who has it can operate well or badly [Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17]; character is not a principle of any good or bad operation: not of a good operation because it can stand along with mortal sin; nor of a bad one, as is plain, because it is a gift of God and an effect of a sacrament. Therefore, if the Philosopher’s division sufficiently exhausts absolute form in the soul, the proposed conclusion follows.
280. Again, if it were an absolute form it could only be placed in the genus of quality. This is plain by running through the other genera: for it is not substance, because it comes after the complete being of substance; nor is it quantity, it is plain, because it is a spiritual and incorporeal form; and so on running through the others. But it cannot be posited to be a quality, which is proved by running through the species of quality [cf. Categories 4.1b25-29, 8.8b26-10a26].
281. Again, an absolute form has some proper operation, but a character does not have any proper operation, 
therefore etc 
.
282. Besides, any accidental absolute form can be eliminated from that in which it is, because it can be eliminated from the subject by the same thing by which it can be impressed on the subject, at least by God, because from the fact it is posterior to the subject there is no contradiction in its not being present in it; a character is simply indelible; therefore etc .
283. To the opposite:
A character is a disposition for grace; but grace is an absolute form; therefore the form also that is a disposition for it will be absolute, for a proper disposition is of the same genus as the form for which it is a disposition.
284. Again, a character is a principle assimilating the one baptized to Christ, or to another who is baptized; but likeness is a unity founded on quality; therefore character is a quality.
I. To the Question
A. The Opinion of Thomas Aquinas
285. Here it is said [Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1; Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.5 princ.2 q.153] that a character is an absolute form.
286. For this are adduced four reasons:
The first is of this sort [Aquinas, ST IIIa q.63 a.4 ad 1; Richard, ibid.]: change is only toward an absolute form, Physics 5.2.225b11; there is change toward a character -as is plain about someone baptized in pretense who receives nothing new in baptism save the character.
287. The second thus [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1, Richard, ibid.]: a relation cannot be the foundation of a relation, because then there would be a process to infinity; but a character is the foundation of many relations, for it is the foundation of likeness (as was argued [n.199]); and also foundation of the relation that ‘sign’ introduces, because a character is a commemorative sign with respect to the received sacrament; it is also a foundation of conformity and obligation to Christ [n.199].
288. Third thus [Aquinas, ST III q.63 a.2, Richard, ibid.]: relation is not a power, either active or passive, because it is a principle neither of acting nor of undergoing; but a character is a power, as that the character of baptism is a passive power by which a man becomes capable of the other sacraments, and the character of Order is an active power for many sacred acts in the Church; therefore etc .
289. Fourth thus [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.4, Richard, ibid.]: in every sacrament there is caused in the soul of the one who receives the sacrament some relation for action or undergoing, and yet a character is not impressed in every sacrament; therefore a character is not just such relation, therefore it is some absolute form.
B. Rejection of the Opinion
1. Against him who Holds this Opinion from his own Statements
290. Argument against this:
First against the one who holds this opinion from his own statements, because he contradicts himself:
For he himself says [Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.2, ST IIIa q.73 a.2] that this is the definition of a character: “A character is a sign of communion in the faith and in holy order, given by a hierarch,” or that it is “a sign of communion in divine things and the sacred order of the faithful.” In whatever way it is defined, this way or that, he says that ‘sign’ is placed in the definition of character as the genus.54
291. From this it is argued that a character cannot be any absolute form, because to the quiddity of an absolute form no respect essentially belongs, because then the quiddity would be for itself and not for itself; nor even can it be said that relation is put there as genus and is not truly a genus because in this way a subject is put in the definition of an accident, but it is plain that a relation is not the subject of an absolute, nor either is it the idea of being receptive.
292. Again, just as ‘more things are not to be posited without necessity’ [n.205, d.1 n.300], so when something is posited precisely because of something else, it is not to be posited more perfectly than is required for that something else, or than could be concluded from that something else, for the further perfection that would be posited would be posited in vain; but there is no necessity that, because of all the things because of which a character is posited, a character should be an absolute perfection; for all those things can also be sufficiently preserved if it is a relative form; therefore superfluously and without reason is it posited to be an absolute form.
293. The minor [sc. ‘there is no necessity that, because of...absolute perfection,’ n.292] will be plain when solving the reasons for the opinion [nn.294ff.].
2. Against the Reasons Brought Forward in the Opinion
a. To the First Reason
294. The first of these reasons takes a false major [sc. ‘change is only toward absolute form’, n.286]. I prove this in two ways: first by reason, second by authority.
295. [By reason] - First thus: a respect cannot come more intrinsically to a foundation than what necessarily follows the foundation when the term is posited, because a respect altogether cannot be in a foundation when the term is bracketed, because then it would not be a respect but an absolute form. Therefore, if some respect can come from without to a foundation, it follows that it does not necessarily follow the foundation, even when the term is posited; therefore, the respect can be new altogether without newness of foundation or of term; so for its new being there can be a change, because it is not a change to anything absolute.
296. But if you say a respect comes extrinsically to a subject but not to a foundation - this is nothing, because intrinsic relations (as similarity, which follows whiteness and the like) can come extrinsically to a subject, because the foundation comes anew to it; so therefore, if these are intrinsic and the others extrinsic, the difference between them will be in relation to the foundation.55
297. Again, a natural agent cannot act newly unless something new is posited either in it or in the passive thing undergoes it, or a new relation is posited between them (this is plain, because all things that are related uniformly will have action uniformly, since such agent acts by necessity of nature); therefore if some natural agent has some new action, there will be either some absolute form in the agent before the new action, or some new form in the passive subject, or some new relation of the agent to the passive subject. But neither the first nor the second is necessary, for fire can newly act on wood without the fact that, before the action, the fire or the wood receive a new form, because the first absolute form that the wood receives is there through this action [sc. the form of being ash or cinders is received by the wood through the action of burning]; therefore by this action there is a new relation there of the fire to the wood without any newness of absolute form.
298. This is plain by experiment, because when an active thing is disposed in the same way according to its active form, and the passive thing is disposed in the same way according to its proximate passive potency, if there were some impediment interposed between them, the agent will not act on the passive thing; but when the impediment or obstacle is removed, it will act; therefore a new relation of agent to passive thing is present there without a new absolute form.
299. [By authority] - This is proved from the Philosopher’s intention in Physics 5.2.225b11-13, because although he deny being moved is in the genus of ‘to something’, insofar as to the genus ‘to something’ belong relations that arise intrinsically [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.54], yet he does not deny that motion or change is in the genus ‘to something’ arising intrinsically, rather he concedes it; for he concedes that motion is properly in the genus ‘where’ [cf. Ord. III d.1 n.61], and yet ‘where’ is only a certain respect of the circumscribing body to the located thing or is the circumscribing body.
b. To the Second Reason
300. The second reason too [n.287] has a false major, namely that ‘a relation cannot be founded on a relation’, because according to Euclid Elements of Geometry V def.4, ‘proportionality is a likeness of two proportions’: therefore on a proportion, which formally states a relation, or on its unity, is founded a likeness.
301. And if you argue that ‘likeness is unity in quality’ Metaphysics 5.15.1021a9-12, I say: although in one way ‘what’ is appropriated to the genus of substance, and in the same way ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ (which follow something insofar as ‘what’ is founded on substance), and although ‘equal’ is founded on unity of quantity (taken strictly), ‘like’ on unity of quality - yet taking them in another way ‘what’ is found in every genus, taking the idea of genus very precisely, and ‘what sort of’ is found in every genus (taking form in that genus in the idea of form), and ‘quantity of virtue’ is found in every genus; and so there is found, in this way, in every genus ‘one’, ‘like’, and ‘equal’. For in this way things possessing relations of one species can be said to be alike according to the unity of one relation, just as things possessing one substantial form can be said to be alike according to substance or according to species.
302. And as to what is said [n.262] about the second relation, which is founded on character, namely ‘sign’, I say that if, according to Augustine On Christian Doctrine II ch.1 n.1, “a sign is what, besides the knowledge that it brings to the senses, makes something else come to knowledge” (which is true not only of a sensible sign, taking ‘sense’ strictly for bodily sense, but is true also when taking ‘sense’ generally for cognitive power) - therefore, taking ‘sense’ in this other way for cognitive power, I say thus that there is nothing from the knowledge of which one could come to the knowledge of something else (at least as this is from knowledge of a posterior to a prior), without that posterior thing being able to be called a sign. And thus I concede that on a real relation can be founded the relation of sign to something prior; but such relation not only leads to knowledge of itself but also of something else.
303. And in this way, if someone were to see ‘paternity’ in its foundation, it could be a commemorative sign of a past act of generation. And this is the way it is in the matter at hand.
304. And especially is this not unacceptable, because this relation of sign is only a relation of reason - speaking of a sign instituted at will, of which sort is character with respect to the sacrament or the received sign.
305. As to what is added there [n.287] about the relation of conformity or obligation, it is not cogent; for a religious can, by a vow of religion, be obligated to keeping religion, and he who has done homage can, through the act of doing homage, be obligated to his lord, and in these sort of cases universally [there is obligation] through a preceding promise; and yet there is not there any new absolute form on which the obligation is founded, nor perhaps any relation save one of reason. And so the idea of obligation could be abundantly preserved if it were posited to be a relation of reason, just as filiation in a son could be the idea of some relation to the father (as an obligation to natural love), although it would be possible for it to be filiation alone.
306. And to the proof that then there would be a process to infinity in relations [n.287], it is not valid of real relations, because there is an ultimate relation on which another real relation cannot be founded - just as there is an ultimate accident in beings that cannot be a further subject for another accident; and therefore it does not follow that, if an accident can be in an accident, there is a process to infinity in accidents. However, I readily concede about relations of reason that there can be a process to infinity, because any relation at all, whether real or of reason, can further found another relation of reason.
c. To the Third Reason
307. The third reason [n.288] either equivocates over ‘power’ or contains a false proposition.
For if ‘power’ be taken simply for some act that, without the power, simply could not be obtained, I deny that character is thus a power; for he who is baptized has power simply for no act for which he did not have power when unbaptized, and this whether speaking of an act for which he has power actively or of an act which he receives in some way from another, for in this way someone not baptized could be anointed with chrism just like someone baptized, and he could thus be washed just like someone baptized.
308. But if we speak of the power of ministry, that is, the power by which he is a suitable minister of some principal agent (and without that power he would not be a suitable minister of that principal agent), there is no need that that power be an absolute form, but it is enough in many cases that it be only a relation of reason.
309. The proof of this is according to them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.24 q.3 a.2], because they do not say that the episcopacy is an order beyond the priesthood, and yet a bishop has a ministerial power of a sort that a non-bishop does not have. For he is a suitable minister in an act God assists with, as in the act of ordaining, and God would not assist similarly if someone else, a non-bishop, were to carry out a similar act. Likewise, if an appointed judge pass a sentence, the sentence holds; but it would not have held before, because a sentence passed by its non-judge is null.
310. Nor yet does this judge or that bishop have any real absolute form, nor perhaps a relative form, save only one of reason.
311. For by that relation of reason by which he is appointed judge by the prince, the will of the prince ratifies the sentence passed by him, and wills it be observed; but he does not ratify the sentence of another who has not been appointed judge, nor does he will it to be observed. And so the judge, by that relation to the will of the prince, has in respect of the prince (as principal agent) a ministerial power for suitably carrying out some act ministerially that, without such relation, he could not suitably carry out.
312. And much more could a real relation, were it present, be posited to be this sort of power of suitably carrying out some act ministerially. For it is plain that a son, because he is a son, can have some authority for carrying out some act in his father’s house that a non-son does not have, and again a nephew [can have authority] for some act but an inferior one; and this power, in authority this way or that, of prescribing or commanding, is only kinship or sonship.
313. In this way is the response clear to the powers about which in particular the argument is.
For the power of ordaining and confirming, if it is an active power, is only for ministering suitably in such an act for such a lord, so that the lord himself, operating principally, may assist with the ministerial act in the way he would not assist with such ministry shown by another.
Now the baptismal character, if it is posited to be a passive power, is not simply passive, either as being receptive or as being the idea of receiving, for nothing absolutely can the soul of someone baptized receive that the soul of someone not baptized cannot receive; but the character is a certain power, relative by way of congruity, from the principal such agent disposing it to act on a passive subject possessing such form and not on any other passive subject.
314. Now such an idea, relative by way of congruity in respect of some principal agent acting voluntarily, can be a relation alone, just as when someone disposes to do something to someone because he is son or kin, and does not want to cause anything similar to one who does not have such relationship.
d. To the Fourth Reason
315. The fourth reason [n.289] destroys the first. For if in the other sacraments there were caused universally a new relation to the action or undergoing of the sacrament and not a character, then there is a new relation there without a new absolute, unless you imagine [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.1 q.1 a4; cf. supra d.1 n.279] that in any other one there is posited some absolute corresponding to character, as for instance some ornament. But if that ornament is a supernatural form it will be indelible in the way that the character is indelible, because it will not be able to have a demeritorious cause. And then it seems to be a fiction: why could it not be said to be a character, since it is a form prior to the principal effect of the sacrament, and an indelible form? Why also will that ornament not be able to have an effect (when pretense ceases) on the other sacraments, as is posited of character in the sacraments that imprint a character?
316. I respond, therefore, that the reason proves nothing save that character is not a relation to the action or undergoing of the sacrament any more than if it were an absolute form. The proof that it is not any absolute form is that in the other sacraments, according to them [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.1 q.1 a.1, ST IIIa q.63 a.2], some absolute form is impressed but a character is not. And thereby can it be said that in any other sacrament there is not impressed any relation that remains after the act; but a character, if it is a relation, remains after the act of baptism received; indeed it remains always.
e. Conclusion
C. Two Doubts as to the Question
318. But there remain two doubts: first about the proximate foundation of the relation; the other, how the characters of diverse sacraments can be distinguished from each other.
1. About the First Doubt
319. About the first, it may seem to someone [Aquinas, Metaphysics 5 lect.17] that the act of reception of the sacrament, when it crosses over into the past, would be the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of founding the relation [n.317].
320. But that is false, especially in the matter at issue, because the idea of founding and the relation are in the same proximate subject (the reception of the sacrament and the character). Even if they be in the same supposit, yet not in the same proximate subject; because the reception of baptism was in the supposit according to the body, the character according to the soul.
321. Now it is generally false here and in other cases, for two reasons;
First, because non-being cannot be the foundation or idea of founding any real relation, because neither can it be the term. For on this account, ‘relation of reason’ is reckoned a contradiction, because it has a negation as foundation or term [cf. Scotus, Praedicamenta, q.25 nn.22-24]; an act crossing over into the past, after it has crossed over, is simply not; therefore after it has crossed over, no new relation is founded on it.
322. The fact, second, is plain because to an immutable term and on an altogether immutable foundation a relation cannot be founded unless it simply necessarily inheres in the foundation - hence if some essence of a creature were simply immutable, its relation to God would be simply immutable; therefore if character state some relation to God (about whom it is plain that he is an immutable foundation), and it is founded on an act as it is past, and the past act as past is simply necessary (insofar as it cannot by absolute divine power be non-past), it follows that that real relation would be altogether immutable, even when speaking of God’s absolute power. But this is unacceptable, because there would be some real relation, different from its foundation, that God could not by his absolute power eliminate from its foundation, as eliminating a posterior from a prior.
323. And these last two proofs [nn.321-322] prove that paternity is not founded on ‘having generated’.
324. And if you bring against this the remark in Metaphysics 5.15.1021a21-25 [“‘father’ is so called by the fact he generates”], I reply that an act could be the cause in the coming to be of the relation (and indeed, when the cause was, then the relation was coming to be present), but it is not a cause of the relation’s being present, just as it does not remain while the relation does; but a foundation is not only cause of coming to be present but also of being present.
325. What then is the foundation of paternity?
I say that the proximate foundation is the very generative power, not when speaking of the respect that power of itself states, but of the absolute that is denominated by the respect.
326. I say therefore, by way of similarity to the matter at hand, that if character is a real relation, its proximate foundation is the bare soul itself (but whether a power or the essence will be discussed in the following question [nn.371-372]); because a respect that arises extrinsically can be founded on a foundation whose principles it in no way leaves, nor need its proximate foundation be in any way determined for it by its own proper idea (because then the respect would not arise extrinsically), but is only determined for it by the very agent; so it is in the matter at hand.
2. About the Second Doubt
327. To the second doubt [n.318] I say that just as, if character were reckoned an absolute form, characters would be said to be distinguished from each other formally, so, if they be posited to be those respects, although they could be distinguished extrinsically from what is extrinsic, yet they are distinguished from each other formally.
328. But if you ask, ‘why then are there only three characters?’,56 I say (because I will not make special mention of this in the matter about confirmation or of orders) that this is plain in these polities that are worldly. For no one has a determinate rank in the family of a king because he eats or drinks, or because after an offense the lord is reconciled to him, or because he multiplies persons in the polity; for these common acts can exist in everyone in any rank at all; but someone has a rank when he is received into the family of the lord, another when he advances further and is constituted a soldier for defending the republic, another when he is constituted a superior under the lord for constituting others in determinate ranks in his family - as for instance an official general or immediate under the lord, to whom is committed a general authority for receiving others into the family of the lord.
329. And therefore if a name were imposed that signified rank in the family or dignity or bailiwick, someone would not be said to have rank or dignity because coming to the dining table or married or returning to grace after an offense; but he who was taken up from the people into the family of the lord would be said to have a rank, and he a further rank who would be constituted in the family for defending the house, and he a further rank in the family who would be constituted as superintendent for receiving others into the family and instructing an inferior.
330. So is it in the issue at hand; three sacraments (namely eucharist for spiritual nourishment, matrimony for bodily procreation, penance for reconciliation57) constitute someone in no definite rank in the Church; rather they can be common to every member of the Church in any rank whatever.
331. But the first rank in the Church and the most universal is to be received into the family of Christ, which happens in baptism; the second special one is to be constituted a soldier for the defense of the Christian faith, which happens in confirmation; the third is to be constituted a father and pastor for introducing others into the Church and for instructing and directing others in the Church, which happens in orders.
332. And just as in the polity [n.328] it is not fitting for the three dignities to be repeated, namely reception into the family, promotion to the military, and superintendence as to doctrine, but nutrition and procreation and reconciliation [n.329] can well be repeated, - so in the issue at hand, it is not proper for the three orders to be repeated, but the others are repeated; and in those that are not to be repeated an unrepeatable rank is acquired and a character said to be conferred; not in the ones that are not to be repeated.
D. Scotus’ own Opinion
333. To the question it can be said that, just as it cannot be proved that any real form is impressed in the reception of baptism that is other than grace and the virtues (and this neither by natural reason nor by reason evident from manifest things believed), so it cannot be proved that a character, if a real form is posited, is an absolute form, real or relational; for both views can be saved: that it is a relational form (as was already shown [nn.290-292]), or that it is an absolute form (if it is posited it cannot be evidently disproved).
334. For certain things are rationally enough to be conceded about character, if it be posited to exist: as that it is a simple form, spiritual and impressed by God on anyone who receives a non-repeatable sacrament; and that by divine institution it efficaciously signifies the grace of the sacrament; and that it disposes for it (as was made clear in the preceding question [n.259], because it is in the same receptive subject and from the same agent, and is a prior and more imperfect form); and that it is indelible, since it does not have a corruptive demeritorious cause; and that it is a commemorative cause with respect to the reception of the sacrament that went before, and a configuring sign, that is, a sign signifying the soul’s obligation to Christ; that it is also a sign making one like another who has received the sacrament, and distinguishing one from another who has not received it. All these things, which are seen to be rationally conceded about character (if it be posited to be a real form) can be preserved if it is posited to be a real respect in the way aforesaid [n.333], or if it is a real absolute form. But if it is posited to be a real respective form, it was said before [n.326] how the above things will be preserved and of what sort the respect is, that it is a respect that arrives extrinsically. But if it is posited to be an absolute form, it is necessary to say that it belongs to the genus of quality, and it is not necessary to determine how all the above conditions agree with it, because it is sufficiently clear.
E. Doubt as to Scotus’ own Opinion
335. But then there is a doubt as to what species of quality it should be put in.58
1. Consideration of the Diverse Opinions or Solutions
a. About the First Solution
336. It is said [Richard of Middleton] that because it is a supernatural quality it is not necessary for it to be put in the genus of quality (which is proved through the Philosopher Metaphysics 10.10.1058b11-12, “Corruptible and incorruptible differ by more than genus”); natural and supernatural differ more than corruptible and incorruptible, because corruptible and incorruptible are contained under a single member of the division, namely natural; therefore much more do natural and supernatural differ more than in genus.
337. To the contrary:
Faith, hope, and charity are certain supernatural things, and yet they are conceded [Bonaventure, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] to be properly in the genus of quality.
338. This same thing appears in another way, because natural and supernatural are not conditions save in comparison to the agent; but comparison to an agent does not vary something as to its being in a genus, because something is put in a genus by its formal proper quiddity, relation to an agent being bracketed.
339. Nor is the statement of the Philosopher in the Metaphysics [n.336] compelling, because he is speaking of physical genus, for in this way no two things are of the same genus unless they are mutually changeable; but the same logical genus can well contain many things that do not belong to the same physical genus59 - it is plain about corporeal and incorporeal substance, and corporeal and spiritual quality.
b. About Other Possible Solutions
340. In another way it is said [Richard of Middleton, William of Ware, Peter of Tarentaise] that, according as it is a principle of configuring, it can be put in the fourth species; according as it is a principle of assimilating, it can be put in the third species; and as it is a power, in the second species; and as it is a disposition for grace, in the first as a disposition but, insofar as it is immovably permanent, in the same species as a habit.
341. But this is not valid, because although it could have many properties according to which it is assimilated to the forms of the diverse species of quality, yet it cannot in itself be so many quidditatively; for it is in itself only one quiddity simply; therefore it will be in only one species.
342. However this statement [n.340] could have some probability about one other opinion, because in truth the division of quality into four species is not properly of a genus into species but is only according to diverse modes agreeing with diverse qualities. And perhaps to the same quality in itself in its essence there could belong several modes that are posited as proper to diverse qualities.
c. About another Peculiar Possible Solution
343. In another way it is said [opinion reported and rejected by Bonaventure and Aquinas] that it is in the fourth species of quality, because it is a certain spiritual figure.
344. But this is nothing, because nothing is placed in a genus through metaphorical properties, otherwise Christ would truly be in the genus of inanimate substance (for he is metaphorically called ‘rock’ [I Corinthians 10.4]), and in the genus of irrational animal (because he is said metaphorically to be a ‘lion’ [Revelation 5.5]), and in the genus of quality (because he is said to be ‘light’, “I am the light of the world,” [John 8.12]). But from metaphors is to be collected the proper condition of a thing in itself, and according to this condition must it be placed in genus and species; for in this way could ‘intelligible species’ be put in the fourth species of quality, because it configures the soul to the very subject [sc. of thought].
2. Scotus’ own Solution
345. I respond, therefore, that if character be posited as an absolute accident, it can be put in the second species of quality or also in the first.
346. And neither of these can be evidently disproved.
For if it is argued [Bonaventure] that character is not a power because it is supernatural and that to the second species belongs only natural power - this is a nothing, because although the Philosopher was only speaking of natural power by way of exemplification, however60 a spiritual power, if it is absolute and accidental and spiritual, can well be reckoned to belong to the same intermediate genus, under quality, as natural power, just as also supernatural habit is reckoned to belong to the same intermediate genus as natural habit.
347. Also if it be posited to be the first species, as a habit, because it is movable with difficulty - this cannot be disproved.
348. Even if it be argued against this [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.1] that it is a supernatural power, therefore not a habit (and the consequence is proved by way of likeness, because a natural power is not a natural habit); and second, because it is a disposition for grace therefore it is not a habit; and third, because every habit disposes to acting well or badly (Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17), but character does not; fourth, because every habit disposes to facility of action (Ethics 2) - these are not probative:
349. Not the first [n.347] because a supernatural power, that is, a supernatural form, movable with difficulty can well be a principle of acting or of resisting what is corruptive of it, and thus have the idea of supernatural power. Nor is the likeness [n.348] valid, because a natural habit states a certain induced facility over and above the natural power, because a natural power is that whereby we are naturally able to do the acts we can do; but a supernatural power can be an immovable spiritual form, and to this extent can be called a habit, yet it is a principle whereby we can do such spiritual or supernatural act.
350. The second [n.348] is not compelling, because one habit can well be the disposition for another habit, just as, according to those who distinguish the habit of the principle from the habit of the conclusion, the habit of the principle disposes to the habit of the conclusion; neither is a disposition, as distinguished from a habit, for this reason in the first species, for it is a quality easily movable, by contrast with a habit.
351. Third, about acting well or badly [n.348], this is not necessary, because there can be an indifferent habit; for thus, from frequent acting absolutely, an aptitude is acquired for acting by such action with neither goodness nor badness, just as neither was or is the generative act of such sort, namely bad or good. And this is clear: for someone, who is frequently considering a geometrical conclusion, can have an extensive aptitude for considering a conclusion in that science, and the habit there is not good or bad, just as neither is the act from which it was being generated. And so can it be in a supernatural habit.
352. And if you say [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.4 q.1 a.3 ad 1] that a supernatural habit is not such, because it is given for the perfection of the receiver - I reply that this sort of supernatural habit can be a disposing for a good act, though it not be the proximate or sufficient principle elicitive of it; and in this way infused faith is not a sufficient principle of eliciting an act of believing, nor infused charity of eliciting an act of loving, but they incline (when the other necessary things concur) so that a good act be elicited. I say thus that some supernatural habit can incline rather remotely and imperfectly to a good act; and such is character posited to be, as first and very remotely disposing to good acts.
353. The fourth [n.348], about facility, has no validity, because it is not true save of an acquired habit; for an infused habit does not bestow facility for act, as is plain in a recent convert for whom it is not easy after conversion to elicit good acts but difficult, until from a frequency of good acts he will have acquired some acquired virtue.
II. To the Initial Arguments on Both Sides
354. To the arguments for both sides:
To the first [n.279]: if it be posited to be an absolute form, it can be called either a power or a habit, according to the two ways already stated [nn.346-347].
355. To the second [n.280], it is plain what species of quality it would be put in and how [nn.336-345].
356. To the next [n.281]: quantity is an absolute form, and yet it is not posited to be active. Therefore, it is necessary to explain that it has an operation with respect to which it is a sufficient principle, or that it in some way is disposed to operation. And so I concede in the issue at hand that this form is a remote disposition for good operation.
357. As to the fourth [n.282] the answer is plain from the end of the preceding question [n.272].
358. To the first argument for the opposite [n.283]: it is not unacceptable for some relation to make disposition for an absolute form, speaking of disposition not in respect of a natural agent nor of a disposition that is the idea of a receptive subject, but of a suitable disposition in respect of a supernatural agent, that is, a disposition by which he who has it is suitably of a nature to be acted on by such supernatural agent; because also in this way a relation can be a disposition in respect of any voluntary agent - just as when someone willingly has a son as suitable object of some action, but someone foreign to such relation, although equal in everything absolute, does not have [such relation] for suitable object of action.
359. To the next about likeness [n.284], it is plain how a likeness is not only founded on quality as it is a distinct genus, but as the idea of it is found generally in all forms; for in this way someone mentally crucified can be said to be like Christ bodily crucified, and the like.